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 Endogenous discounting and climate policy




Under risk of abrupt climate change, the occurrence hazard is
added to the social discount rate. As a result, the social discount
rate (i) increases and (ii) turns endogenous to the global warming
policy. The second e®ect bears profound policy implications that are
magni¯ed by economic growth. In particular, we ¯nd that greenhouse
gases (GHG) emission should be terminated at a ¯nite time so that
the ensuing occurrence risk will vanish in the long run. Due to the
public bad nature of the catastrophic risk, the second e®ect is ignored
in a competitive allocation and unregulated economic growth will give
rise to excessive emissions. In fact, the GHG emission paths under the
optimal and competitive growth regimes lie at the extreme ends of the
range of feasible emissions. We derive the Pigouvian hazard tax that
implements the optimal growth regime.
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Among the possible impacts of global warming, those associated with
abrupt climate change are particularly disturbing (Alley et al. 2003, Stern
2007, IPCC4 2007). Abrupt events refer to non-marginal changes in the cli-
mate system, triggered, e.g., as the (smooth) global warming process crosses
some threshold level, that may in°ict large-scale and irreversible damages at
unpredictable dates. The combination of unpredictable, abrupt occurrence
and catastrophic damage poses a delicate policy challenge. We study opti-
mal greenhouse gases (GHG) emission policy for a growing economy under
threats of catastrophic climate change.
The catastrophic threat is represented by a hazard rate that depends on
the atmospheric GHG concentration and characterizes the probability of the
event occurrence time.1 While the competitive (market) allocation takes full
account of the hazard rate per se, it fails to account for the change in hazard
associated with economic activities, as the hazard is in e®ect a pure public
bad.2 As a result the competitive (unregulated) growth regime is suboptimal.
We characterize the optimal growth regime by means of a Pigouvian hazard
tax on emission, which depends on the sensitivity of the hazard to the GHG
1There are two main reasons for our lack of perfect knowledge regarding global warm-
ing induced catastrophes. First, the conditions that trigger occurrence may be genuinely
stochastic. Second, we may have only partial knowledge of the parameters that charac-
terize these conditions. In this work we concentrate on the ¯rst cause and consequently
assume that the hazard rate function is known.
2This is part of what Stern (2007) called "...the greatest and widest-ranging market
failure ever seen."
1concentration and vanishes for an exogenous hazard. We ¯nd that under
risk of catastrophic occurrence a growing economy should terminate GHG
emission at a ¯nite time and the ensuing occurrence risk will eventually
vanish. In contrast, under an unfettered market allocation, emission is
driven to an economically maximal rate at a ¯nite time and remains at that
rate thereafter. The ensuing hazard will thus stabilize at the maximal rate in
the long run. We show how the proposed Pigouvian hazard tax implements
the optimal growth regime in a competitive environment.
The analysis bears directly on the key issues regarding global warming
policy, namely the extent and timing of GHG emission reduction. The re-
ceived view recommends a gradual approach of a modest reduction in the
short run and sharper cuts in the longer run (Nordhaus 1999, Nordhaus and
Boyer 2000). This view has been challenged by Stern (2007), who recom-
mended a more vigorous and early response, giving rise to a lively debate
(see Arrow 2007, Dasgupta 2007, Nordhaus 2007, Weitzman 2007a). The de-
bate revolves on the parameters ½ (the pure rate of time preference), ´ (the
elasticity of marginal utility) and g (per capita growth in consumption) that
comprise the social discount rate ½+´g by which costs and bene¯ts should be
discounted. With a catastrophic risk, the hazard rate is added to the social
discount rate. At a ¯rst glance it may appear that this weakens the case
for an early vigorous response (as the inclusion of the hazard increases the
social discount rate). However, while ½; ´ and g are exogenous parameters,3
3We assume exogenous technical change. In general g will also be a®ected by the
2the hazard rate depends on the emission policy and is therefore endogenous.
The presence of the hazard rate in the social discount rate, thus, turns the
latter endogenous to the global warming policy. This endogeneity feature
underlies our analysis and is the raison d'^ etre for the Pigouvian hazard tax.4
Early studies of possible climate policy responses to catastrophic threats
include Clarke and Reed (1994) and Tsur and Zemel (1996). Nordhaus and
Boyer (2000), Mastrandrea and Schneider (2001) and Stern (2007) study
e®ects of catastrophic damages on GHG emission policy within elaborate in-
tegrated assessment models. Recent contributions to this vein include N½v-
dal (2006), Karp and Tsur (2007), Weitzman (2007b), and Tsur and Zemel
(2008). The present analysis builds on Tsur and Zemel (2008) who stud-
ied the regulation of environmental threats in a stationary economy. They
proposed a Pigouvian hazard tax on emission that implements the optimal
allocation and showed that it reduces, but does not eliminate, emission. In-
corporating growth, we ¯nd a signi¯cant di®erence: the Pigouvian hazard
tax is so adjusted as to cease emission altogether at a ¯nite time in order
to eliminate the ensuing catastrophic risk. Thus, the GHG emission paths
under the optimal and competitive growth regimes lie at the extreme ends
of the range of feasible emissions.
The next section describes the general setup. Section 3 presents the main
climate change policy but this dependence is weaker than that of the hazard.
4Stern's (2007) rationale for a positive ½ is the presence of an exogenous extinction
hazard such as that due to a devastating meteorite (see also discussion in Beckerman and
Hepburn 2007). The hazard here, which is associated with a global warming induced
catastrophe, depends on the emission policy and is therefore endogenous.
3results by characterizing the competitive (unregulated) and socially optimal
growth regimes. Section 4 concludes and the appendix contains technical
derivations.
2 The economy
To the economic structure considered in Tsur and Zemel (2008) we add
an exogenous labor-augmenting technical change. The economy consists of
a ¯nal good manufacturing sector, an intermediate good (energy) sector,
households (that own capital and labor) and a regulator. We brie°y describe
the economy, focusing on the added (growth) component.
2.1 Firms
There are ¯nal good manufacturing ¯rms and intermediate good (energy)
supplying ¯rms. The ¯nal good ¯rms rent capital and labor from households
and purchase energy in order to produce a homogenous ¯nal good, taking
prices parameterically and seeking to maximize (instantaneous) pro¯t at each
time period. Summing over all ¯nal good ¯rms gives the aggregate output
Y (k(t);x(t);A(t)) (2.1)
as a function of capital (k), energy (x) and labor inputs, where
A(t) ´ e
gt (2.2)
is an exogenous labor-augmenting technical change process and the labor
force is assumed constant, hence normalized to unity. The technology Y (¢;¢;¢)
4is linearly homogenous, increasing and concave in each variable, with positive
mixed derivatives.
Energy, x = x1 + x2, can be derived from polluting (x1) or clean (x2)
sources. The former refers to fossil energy and the latter to non-emitting
sources such as solar, wind, hydro or geothermal energy. Fossil energy (x1)
is manufactured (extracted, distilled and distributed) with an increasing and
strictly convex cost function Z(¢), re°ecting the fact that as the supply rate
increases, more expensive (or less e±cient) sources need to be used. The
fossil energy supply curve is thus the upward sloping marginal cost curve
Z0(¢).
We assume that the clean energy (x2) production technology exhibits
constant returns to scale with a constant marginal cost, denoted p2. This
is obviously an abstraction. On the one hand, economies of scale are likely
to prevail for these immature technologies due to learning by doing or R&D
aimed at enhancing their e±ciency (none of which is considered here). On
the other hand, sites suitable for harvesting these alternative energy resources
are not unlimited, so expanding them signi¯cantly will give rise to increasing
costs. Regardless of which trend dominates, allowing the marginal cost of
clean energy to increase or decrease over certain domains will not change the
main message of this work, provided the rate of change is smaller than that
of the marginal cost of fossil energy.5 The energy supply curve is therefore
5The results persist under a non-constant marginal cost of clean energy p2(x), provided




where 0 < Z0(0) < p2 is assumed (i.e., the most e±cient fossil sources are
less expensive than the clean resources).
The (inverse) demand for energy is given by its value of marginal product
Yx(k;x;A) ´ @Y=@x. The allocation of x(t) = x1(t)+x2(t) at time t equates
supply and demand:
minfZ
0(x(t));p2g = Yx(k(t);x(t);A(t)): (2.3)
At each point of time, given k(t) and A(t), the competitive (unregulated)
allocation of x1(t) and x2(t) is determined according to
Yx(k(t);x1(t) + x2(t);A(t)) = Z
0(x1(t)) (2.4a)
and
Yx(k(t);x1(t) + x2(t);A(t)) · p2; equality holding if x2(t) > 0: (2.4b)
Let
¹ x1 ´ Z
0¡1(p2) (2.5)
represent the maximal fossil energy supply rate (above which clean energy
is cheaper). When k and A give rise to Yx(k; ¹ x1;A) > p2, condition (2.4b)
holds as an equality. In this case x > ¹ x1, x1 = ¹ x1 and x2 = x ¡ ¹ x1 > 0.
62.2 Catastrophic climate change
Using the polluting resource at the rate x1 entails emission at the rate
e(x1) of GHG which accumulate in the atmosphere to form the stock Q
according to
_ Q(t) = e(x1(t)) ¡ ±Q(t): (2.6)
The emission function satis¯es e(0) = 0 and e0(x1) > " > 0 for x1 2 [0; ¹ x1],
and ± > 0 is the rate of natural decay.6 Increasing atmospheric GHG con-
centration modi¯es the mean global temperature, which in turn a®ects large
scale natural processes with potential catastrophic consequences. Each link
in this chain of events (leading from changing GHG concentration to the
ensuing damage) is in°uenced by a myriad of uncertainties (Pindyck 2007,
Schelling 2007). The event occurrence date is therefore random with a distri-
bution that depends on the GHG concentration. This distribution induces
a hazard rate function h(¢), such that h(Q(t))dt measures the conditional
probability that the catastrophe will occur during [t;t+dt] given that it has
not occurred by time t when the GHG concentration is Q(t). We normalize
h(¢) at h(0) = 0 and assume that it is strictly increasing over the relevant
domain, i.e., h0(Q) > " > 0 for Q 2 [0; ¹ Q], where ¹ Q is the maximal GHG
concentration de¯ned as follows. If x1(t) is ¯xed at the maximal rate ¹ x1 of
6Q(t) measures the di®erence between the current atmospheric GHG concentration and
the preindustrial level, where the latter is the stock level at which natural emission and
decay are equal.
7(2.5) from some time t0 on, the GHG stock evolves according to
Q(t) = ¹ Q ¡ ( ¹ Q ¡ Q(t0))e
¡±(t¡t0) (2.7)
towards its maximal level
¹ Q = e(¹ x1)=± (2.8)
and the hazard rate approaches the maximal rate
¹ h = h( ¹ Q): (2.9)
Recent evaluations (Stern 2007, IPCC4 2007) of likely outcomes of global
warming are alarming. The current atmospheric GHG concentration is es-
timated at 430 ppm of CO2e, compared with 280 ppm at the onset of the
Industrial Revolution. Under a business-as-usual scenario, the concentra-
tion could double the pre-Industrial level by 2035 and treble this level by
the end of the century. The recent IPCC report gives 2 ¡ 4:5oC as a likely
range for the increase in equilibrium global mean surface air temperature
due to doubling of atmospheric GHG concentration with a non-negligible
chance of exceeding this range (IPCC4 2007, p. 749). The Stern report
gives 2 ¡ 5oC and 3 ¡ 10oC as likely ranges for equilibrium global mean
warming due to doubling and trebling of GHG concentration, respectively
(Stern 2007). Even more disturbing is the observation that the probability
of outcomes that signi¯cantly exceed the most likely estimates is far from
negligible. The pessimistic side of possible global warming outcomes can
therefore give rise to truly catastrophic events (the usual list includes the
8reversal of the thermohaline circulation, a sharp rise in sea level, the spread
of lethal diseases and massive species extinction).
Like the conditions that trigger an abrupt event, the damage it will in°ict
is fraught with uncertainties and is not easily quanti¯ed into a representative
index. A common practice is to use post-event scenarios that are easier to
understand, e.g., a GDP reduction from the occurrence date onwards or re-
duction of the growth rate by a certain percent (see, e.g., Stern 2007, Chapter
6). Such scenarios serve as the basis for evaluating a policy that recommends
to spend a certain amount today (e.g., by reducing GHG emission) in order
to eliminate or decrease the expected damage. Here we assume that upon
occurrence consumption is reduced to a certain (predetermined) rate and
grows at the (exogenous) growth rate thereafter. Other climate change im-
pacts can be postulated without changing the main message regarding the
e®ect of hazard endogeneity on emission policies.
2.3 Households





where ´ is the elasticity of marginal utility, assumed larger than one (see,
e.g., Dasgupta 2007, Arrow 2007, Weitzman 2007a). Let T represent the
(random) event-occurrence time, at which date consumption falls to the
(prespeci¯ed) rate cp and increases at the rate g thereafter. The (planned)
9consumption stream fc(t); t ¸ 0g, thus, generates the utility °ow
(
u(c(t)) for t · T
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(2.13)
is the post event value.
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; (2.16)




¡¡(t)dt + Ã: (2.17)
10The elasticity of the "shifted" utility w0(¢) is ´ { the same as the elasticity of
u0(¢). Notice that for the event to be damaging rather than rewarding, the
optimal expected payo® must exceed the post event value Ã, i.e., the ¯rst
term of (2.17) is positive under the optimal policy. We assume that a con-
sumption stream that satis¯es this condition is feasible, which presupposes
some restrictions on the model's parameters.
It is seen from equation (2.14) that the hazard rate is added to the pure
rate of time preference to form the \hazard-inclusive" pure rate of time pref-
erence ½ + h(Q). Adding ´g gives the corresponding \hazard-inclusive" social
discount rate ½ + h(Q) + ´g.
The returns from labor and capital (including pro¯ts from the energy
sector) give the household budget constraint at time t (see details in Tsur
and Zemel 2008)
_ k(t) = Y (k(t);x1(t) + x2(t);A(t)) ¡ p2x2(t) ¡ Z(x1(t)) ¡ c(t): (2.18)
Households choose their consumption-saving plan according to
v






subject to (2.18), given k(0) = k0. In solving this problem, households as-
sume that the intermediate inputs x1(¢) and x2(¢) are exogenously determined
according to (2.4a)-(2.4b). The ensuing processes e(x1); Q(¢); ¡(¢) and ­(¢)
are therefore also exogenous.
112.4 Regulator
The socially optimal allocation is the outcome of
v






subject to (2.6), (2.18), _ ­(t) = h(Q(t)); x1(t) ¸ 0; x2(t) ¸ 0 and c(t) ¸ 0,
given k(0) = k0; Q(0) = Q0 and ­(0) = 0. We denote by ¸(¢) and °(¢)
the costate variables of capital k(¢) and GHG stock Q(¢), respectively, corre-
sponding to the social allocation problem (2.20).
The regulator seeks to implement the social allocation in a competitive





represent the shadow price of the GHG stock in capital (the numeraire)
units. When the tax rate ¯(t) is levied on emission e(x1) in a competitive
environment, the energy supply curve (the left hand side of (2.3)) is modi¯ed
to minfZ0(x(t)) + ¯(t)e0(x(t));p2g: Thus, the conditions that govern the
allocation of fossil and clean energy at time t change from (2.4a)-(2.4b) to
Yx(k(t);x1(t) + x2(t);A(t)) · Z
0(x1(t)) + ¯(t)e
0(x1(t));
equality holding if x1 > 0 (2.22a)
and
Yx(k(t);x1(t) + x2(t);A(t)) · p2; equality holding if x2 > 0: (2.22b)
12The Pigouvian hazard tax is the optimal ¯(t) corresponding to the solu-
tion of (2.20). Suppose that this tax is levied on emission. Is the resulting,
regulated-competitive allocation optimal? The answer, it turns out, is in the
a±rmative. We state this result in
Proposition 1. The Pigouvian hazard tax implements the optimal allocation.
The proof is similar to the proof given in Tsur and Zemel (2008) for a sta-
tionary economy (without technical change) and is therefore omitted.
The allocation (2.22) implies that with su±ciently high tax rate (such that
Z0(0) + ¯(t)e0(0) ¸ p2) the supply rate x1(t) vanishes and energy is supplied
solely from the clean source. We show in the next section that as the
economy grows, the Pigouvian hazard tax ¯(t) increases up to a point where
this condition holds at all subsequent times.
3 Economic growth and GHG emission
Without technical change, Tsur and Zemel (2008) found that the Pigou-
vian hazard tax reduces the use of the hazardous input but does not eliminate
it. It turns out that the e®ect of the hazard externality is even more pro-
nounced in a growing economy. In a growing economy the optimal use of the
hazardous input ceases at a ¯nite time and the ensuing hazard rate vanishes
in the long run. In contrast, the competitive allocation of x1 reaches the
maximal rate ¹ x1 of (2.5) at a ¯nite time and the ensuing hazard will approach
in the long run the maximal rate ¹ h of (2.9). The e®ect of growth, there-
13fore, is to push the di®erence between the long run optimal and competitive
GHG emissions to the extreme: no emission under the social allocation and
maximal emission under the competitive allocation.
It is expedient to recast the economy in terms of the detrended quanti-
ties ~ k(t) ´ k(t)=A(t), ~ x(t) ´ x(t)=A(t), ~ c(t) ´ c(t)=A(t) and the production
function
~ y(~ k; ~ x) ´ Y (k;x;A)=A = Y (~ k; ~ x;1): (3.1)
Convergence of the detrended processes to a steady state means that the
economy approaches a path of steady-state growth. The di®erence between
the competitive and optimal solutions is in the corresponding steady-state
levels { in particular the allocations of the hazardous and clean energy inputs.
Both the competitive and social intertemporal allocation problems include
several state variables, hence global convergence properties cannot be readily
established based on local stability analysis. Characterizing the evolution of
the shadow prices, we establish global convergence to a steady state growth
path for both problems.
Since ~ y~ x = Yx, it follows from (2.4b) and (2.22b) that the total energy
input ~ x satis¯es
~ y~ x(~ k; ~ x) = p2; (3.2)
provided some clean energy is used. For any capital stock ~ k, let ~ x(~ k) be the
~ x level satisfying (3.2) and let
'(~ k) = ~ y~ k(~ k; ~ x(~ k)) (3.3)
14represent the marginal product of capital. De¯ne ^ k as the solution of
'(^ k) = ½ + ¹ h + ´g; (3.4)
where ¹ h is the maximal long run hazard rate, de¯ned in equation (2.9). We
assume that (3.4) admits a unique solution ^ k > 0 such that '(~ k) > ½+´g+¹ h
for ~ k < ^ k and '(~ k) < ½ + ´g + ¹ h for ~ k > ^ k.7 De¯ne
^ x ´ ~ x(^ k); (3.5a)
^ y ´ ~ y(^ k; ^ x) (3.5b)
and
^ c ´ ^ y ¡ p2^ x ¡ g^ k: (3.5c)
With ½ + g(´ ¡ 1) > 0, it follows that ^ c > 0.8
We refer to the unregulated case as business-as-usual (BAU). The long
run behavior of the unregulated economy is characterized in the following
(proofs are presented in the Appendix):
Proposition 2. Under BAU: (i) GHG emission reaches the maximal rate
e(¹ x1) at a ¯nite time and remains at that level thereafter, giving rise to
the maximal long-run GHG concentration ¹ Q = e(¹ x1)=± and hazard rate
¹ h = h( ¹ Q); (ii) the economy reaches a balanced growth path along which
7This assumption holds e.g. for the Cobb-Douglas technology.
8Use the linear homogeneity of Y (¢;¢;¢) and Euler's Theorem to write Y (k;x;A) =
Ykk + Yxx + YAA. Dividing by A, noting that ~ y = Y=A; Yk = ~ y~ k;Yx = ~ y~ x and YA > 0
yields ~ y(~ k; ~ x) > ~ y~ k~ k + ~ y~ x~ x. Use (3.2)-(3.5) and the assumption that ½ + g(´ ¡ 1) > 0 to
obtain ^ c = ^ y ¡ p2^ x ¡ g^ k > ['(^ k) ¡ g]^ k = [½ + g(´ ¡ 1) + ¹ h]^ k > 0.
15k(t) = ^ kA(t), x(t) = ^ xA(t) with x2(t) = ^ xA(t) ¡ ¹ x1, Y (t) = ^ yA(t) and
c(t) = ^ cA(t).
The optimal policy, it turns out, tends to the other extreme, by elimi-
nating emission altogether and driving the economy towards a hazard-free
balanced growth path. Let ^ ks be the unique solution to
'(^ k
s) = ½ + ´g: (3.6)
As above, we assume that '(~ k) > ½ + ´g for ~ k < ^ ks and '(~ k) < ½ + ´g for
~ k > ^ ks. Since ½+¹ h+´g > ½+´g, it follows that ^ k < ^ ks. De¯ne ^ xs, ^ ys and ^ cs
in the same way as their competitive counterparts in (3.5) with ^ ks replacing
^ k. The socially optimal allocation is characterized in:
Proposition 3. Under the optimal growth regime: (i) GHG emission ceases
at a ¯nite time and the ensuing GHG concentration and hazard rate vanish in
the long run; (ii) the economy approaches a hazard-free balanced growth path
along which k(t) = ^ ksA(t); x(t) = ^ xsA(t), Y (t) = ^ ysA(t) and c(t) = ^ csA(t).
Equations (3.4) and (3.6) reproduce the familiar Ramsey (1928) condi-
tion, equating the marginal product of capital with the social discount rate
along the optimal trajectory. The modi¯cation here is due to the presence
of the long run hazard rate in the social discount rate: the maximal hazard ¹ h
under the competitive allocation, and a vanishing hazard under the optimal
regime. As the social discount rate is smaller than its competitive coun-
terpart, the long run capital stock is larger under the social allocation than
under the competitive allocation.
16For a stationary economy (with g = 0), Tsur and Zemel (2008) showed
that the Pigouvian hazard tax will not do away with GHG emission but only
reduce its use to some \bearable" rate. Why is this policy (of maintaining
some GHG stock at an equilibrium level and enjoying the bene¯ts of the
cheaper fossil energy) not desirable for a growing economy? The explanation
is based on the evolution of the cost-bene¯t ratio as the economy grows. At
each point of time, the additional cost in°icted by using the clean input
rather than the (cheaper) polluting input is at most p2¹ x1 ¡ Z(¹ x1). On the
other hand, increasing the discount rate represents a loss of value. Thus,
the bene¯t associated with reduced emissions is the forgone loss obtained
with the smaller discount rate associated with the smaller hazard. While
the cost remains bounded over time, the bene¯t increases as the economy
grows. Thus, the cost-bene¯t ratio diminishes along the path of growth and
eventually it proves worthwhile to eliminate the source of damage altogether.
These considerations are re°ected in the Pigouvian hazard tax ¯(t), which





must hold at some ¯nite time, at which time conditions (2.22) imply that
the use of x1 (and GHG emission) ceases altogether. Since g and ´ a®ect
positively the rate of growth of ¯, each advances GHG abatement. The ¯rst,
because a higher growth rate implies that there is more to lose due to the
event occurrence; the second due to the risk aversion role of ´.
174 Concluding remarks
Under risk of catastrophic climate change, the occurrence hazard rate
augments the social discount rate, increasing and at the same time rendering
it endogenous to the emission policy. The former (increasing) e®ect weak-
ens the case for an early, vigorous reduction in GHG emission while the
latter (endogeneity) e®ect operates in the opposite direction. The competi-
tive growth policy ignores the endogeneity e®ect, whereas the social growth
regime accounts for both. It is thus hardly surprising that the competitive
and social allocations should di®er. What is less obvious is the ¯nding that
the two allocations lie at the extreme ends of the range of possible long run
emissions: maximal emission in the competitive regime and no emission un-
der the social regime. This property is a consequence of economic growth
and the endogeneity of the \hazard-inclusive" social discount rate.
The level at which atmospheric GHG concentration should be stabilized
and how to approach this level are central issues in climate policy discus-
sions. We ¯nd that a growing economy should eventually do away with
GHG emission altogether so that the ensuing (anthropogenic) hazard van-
ishes in the long run. This strong result surely owes to the structure of our
setup, particularly the constant price of the alternative (clean) technology
and the exogenous growth mechanism. Extensions to relax these assumptions
are needed to test for its robustness.
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½ + (´ ¡ 1)g
(A.1)
















[h(Q(¿)) ¡ ¹ h]d¿; (A.3)
_ b(t) = h(Q(t)) ¡ ¹ h < 0; (A.4)
where it is recalled that a tilde over a variable signi¯es detrending (division
by A(t) ´ exp(gt)), e.g. ~ c(t) = c(t)=A(t).
Next, we rewrite (2.18) as
_ ~ k(t) = ~ y(~ k(t); ~ x(t)) ¡ p2~ x(t) ¡ g~ k(t) ¡ ~ c(t) + ¼(x1)e
¡gt (A.5)
where ¼(x1) ´ p2x1 ¡ Z(x1) > 0 is the pro¯t from the polluting resource
when it is used at the rate x1 · ¹ x1 and is bounded by the maximal pro¯t
¼(¹ x1). Note that the pro¯t is de¯ned in terms of the full rate x1 (without
detrending) hence the exponent in the last term of (A.5).
19Let $ ´ ½ + g(´ ¡ 1) + ¹ h > 0. Expressed in terms of the detrended
variables, the household problem is to maximize (A.2) subject to (A.5). The
Hamiltonian for this problem is
H =
~ c1¡´ ¡ Âeg(´¡1)t
1 ¡ ´
e
¡$t¡b(t) + ~ ¸[~ y(~ k; ~ x) ¡ p2~ x ¡ g~ k ¡ ~ c + ¼(x1)e
¡gt]
and the necessary conditions for an optimal policy include:
~ c
¡´e
¡$t¡b(t) ¡ ~ ¸ = 0 (A.6)
and
_ ~ ¸ = ¡~ ¸['(~ k) ¡ g]: (A.7)
De¯ne
m(t) = ~ ¸(t)e
$t+b(t); (A.8)
yielding, using (A.7),
_ m = ¡m['(~ k) ¡ g] + m[$ + _ b] = m[½ + g´ + ¹ h ¡ '(~ k) + _ b]: (A.9)
Let
³(~ k) = ~ y(~ k; ~ x(~ k)) ¡ p2~ x(~ k) ¡ g~ k; (A.10)
so that according to (3.2) and (3.3)
³
0(~ k) = '(~ k) ¡ g (A.11)
and consider a capital stock ~ k below ^ k of (3.4), so that '(~ k) > ½+´g+¹ h. We
now show that after some ¯nite date the optimal ~ k(¢) process must increase
in this region. To see this suppose otherwise, that it decreases, remaining
20below ^ k. In view of (A.4), the right-hand side of (A.9) is negative hence m(¢)
decreases in time. Thus, according to (A.6), the ~ c(¢) process increases in time
below ^ k. With ¼(x1) bounded for x1 2 [0; ¹ x1], the di®erence c(t)¡¼(x1)e¡gt
must also increase at a su±ciently large t. Using (A.11) and $ > 0, we ¯nd
that ³(¢) increases with ~ k for ~ k < ^ k. When ~ k(¢) decreases, the right hand
side of (A.5) is negative and decreasing in time, hence the ~ k(¢) process must
decrease at an ever growing rate, approaching zero at a ¯nite time, which
cannot be optimal9. The increasing consumption process also rules out a
steady state below ^ k, hence ~ k(¢) must increase in this region.
The above discussion implies the existence of some minimal stock ~ kmin > 0
such that ~ k(t) > ~ kmin for all t. We now show that x1 reaches ¹ x1 at some
¯nite time and remains at that rate thereafter. Let ~ xmin be the energy rate
corresponding to ~ kmin such that Yx(~ kminA; ~ xminA;A) = ~ y~ x(~ kmin; ~ xmin) = p2
as de¯ned by (3.2). Let t0 ´ log(¹ x1=~ xmin)=g so that ¹ x1 · ~ xminA(t), for
all t ¸ t0 (equality holding at t = t0) and suppose that x(t) < ¹ x1 at some
time t > t0. Using Ykx > 0, Yxx < 0 and suppressing the time argument for
convenience, we ¯nd
Yx(~ kA;x;A) > Yx(~ kminA;x;A) > Yx(~ kminA; ¹ x1;A) > Yx(~ kminA; ~ xminA;A) = p2
violating (2.4b). It follows that x(t) ¸ ¹ x1 and x1(t) = ¹ x1 at all t > t0.
We can use (A.4), (2.7) and the fact that h0(¢) is bounded in (0; ¹ Q) to
9A vanishing capital implies ceasing producing and consuming, reducing utility to ¡1
from some ¯nite time on.
21obtain at all t > t0
0 > _ b(t) = h(Q(t)) ¡ ¹ h > ¡Be
¡±t; (A.12)
for some positive constant B.
Consider now a capital stock ~ k1 > ^ k, with '(~ k1) < ½ + ´g + ¹ h. From
(A.12) we deduce that following some time t1, the right-hand side of (A.9) is
positive hence the ~ c(¢) process decreases. This implies that after t1 a policy
of increasing ~ k(¢) beyond ~ k1 during a time interval (or inde¯nitely) cannot
be optimal since keeping ~ k(¢) ¯xed at ~ k1 during this interval (diverting the
surplus resources to consumption) is feasible and yields a higher payo®. A
steady state for ~ k(¢) above ^ k is also ruled out by the decreasing consumption
process. It follows that ~ k(¢) must approach ^ k in the long run. The derivation
of the constants of (3.5) follows from (3.2) and the budget constraint (A.5)
in a straightforward manner. 2
Proof of Proposition 3: Following the proof of Proposition 2, we express
the social problem (2.20) in terms of the detrended variables as
v








subject to (2.6), (A.5), _ ­(t) = h(Q(t)), ¡(t) = ½t+­(t) and the usual non-
negativity constraints, given ~ k(0) = ~ k0, Q(0) = Q0, ­(0) = 0. (The emitting
input x1(¢) is not detrended also in this formulation.) The Hamiltonian for
22this problem is
H =




~ ¸[~ y(~ k; ~ x) ¡ p2~ x ¡ g~ k ¡ ~ c + ¼(x1)e
¡gt] + °[e(x1) ¡ ±Q] + ¹h(Q);
where ~ ¸, ° and ¹ are the costate variables of ~ k, Q and ­, respectively.
Necessary conditions for an optimum include
~ c
¡´e
¡¡¡g(´¡1)t ¡ ~ ¸ = 0; (A.14)
~ y~ x(~ k; ~ x) ¡ p2 = 0; (A.15)
~ ¸[p2 ¡ Z
0(x1)]e
¡gt + °e
0(x1) · 0; equality holding if x1 > 0; (A.16)
_ ~ ¸ = ¡~ ¸['(~ k) ¡ g]; (A.17)
_ ° = °± ¡ ¹h
0(Q); (A.18)
_ ¹ =




and the transversality condition
lim
t!1
H(t) = 0: (A.20)
We show that limt!1 Q(t) = 0. Suppose otherwise, then x1(t) > 0 for
arbitrarily large t. At these times, condition (A.16) holds with equality,
giving
Z
0(x1) ¡ (°=~ ¸)e
gte
0(x1) = p2: (A.21)
Since Yx = ~ y~ x = p2, we see that (A.21) agrees with (2.22a) where the tax
rate is set at
¯(t) = ¡(°=~ ¸)exp(gt): (A.22)
23We show that ¯(t) diverges at large t, violating (A.21) and implying that x1(¢)
must vanish from some (¯nite) time onward. Using 0 < h(Q) < ¹ h, we repeat
the arguments of the proof of Proposition 2 to show that the interval [^ k;^ ks]
is attractive in the long run (i.e., the optimal ~ k(¢) process increases below ^ k
and decreases above ^ ks). For ~ k < ^ ks the inequality '(~ k) ¸ ½+´g > g holds,
hence (3.3), (A.11) and (A.15) imply (using Euler's Theorem as in footnote
8) that ³(~ k) > 0 and ³0(~ k) > 0.
We now show that in the long run the optimal ~ c(¢) process is bounded
away from zero. Suppose limt!1 ~ c(t) = 0. Writing (A.5) in the form
_ ~ k = ³(~ k) ¡ ~ c + ¼(x1)exp(¡gt) we ¯nd that following some ¯nite time, if
~ k < ^ ks, the ~ k(¢) process increases in time at an increasing rate, crossing
eventually the state ^ ks and violating the property that the interval [^ k;^ ks]
is attractive. Similarly, if ~ c(¢) grows inde¯nitely in the long run, then the
process ~ k(¢) must eventually decrease in time at an increasing rate, falling
below ^ k. We conclude, therefore, that in the long run both ~ k(¢) and ~ c(¢) are
bounded away from zero in ¯nite intervals.









where M ´ limt!1 °(t)exp(¡±t). A non-vanishing value of M implies that
°(¢) increases exponentially at the rate ±, which violates the transversality








24for some state Qs(t) 2 [0; ¹ Q]. Integrating by parts and using (A.19) and
some algebraic manipulations, we obtain
±(1 ¡ ´)
h0(Qs(t))























where the last step is obtained by integrating (A.19) from t to 1 with the
condition limt!1 ¹(t) = 0 (which follows from the transversality condition
(A.20) when limt!1 Q(t) > 0).




where the functions °1(¢) and °2(¢) are bounded away from zero. When
´ > 1, the second term dominates in the long run, reducing (A.25) to
°(t) ¼ °2(t)e¡¡(t), where °2(¢) < 0. We can now use (A.14) to express
the tax rate ¯(t) ´ ¡(°(t)=~ ¸(t))exp(gt) in the form
¯(t) = ¡~ c
´(t)°2(t)e
´gt (A.26)
which diverges at large t. With e0(¢) bounded away from zero at the relevant
x1 range, we conclude that (A.21) cannot hold at large t, hence x1(¢) must
vanish in ¯nite time.
Comparing (3.2) and (A.15), we ¯nd that the conditions that de¯ne the
total intermediate input rates are the same for the competitive and social
25allocations. With a vanishing x1, we can repeat the arguments of Proposition
2 to conclude that the detrended `~ ' variables approach the constant values
^ ks, ^ xs, ^ ys and ^ cs hence the social process approaches a balanced growth path
with ¹ hs = 0 replacing ¹ h as the eventual hazard rate. The derivation of
the social parameters ^ ks ^ xs, ^ ys and ^ cs is similar to that of their competitive
counterparts. 2
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